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The Czech banking system is seen by many observers to be the most successful of
all former socialist economies’.  But have Czech banks successfully provided worthy
enterprises with sufficient credit from the funds made available to them?  Using data
from the Czech National Bank and data on individual Czech banks, I find evidence
that in 1995 banks are provided with more deposits, but do not transform them into
enterprise loans.  I investigate the possible causes of this great portfolio switch and
find that the central bank instituted a monetary tightening during a regime of fixed
exchange rates and mobile capital.  The central bank sterilized the continuing capital
inflows.  The resulting higher interbank interest rates and competition from foreign
funds made the loan interest margin too narrow for Czech banks to profitably lend. 
The tight money strategy likely contributed to the bank failures in the following year
and may have lead to greater concentration in the Czech banking system.
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I. Introduction
The Czech Republic is at the forefront of central European economies which seek to
rebuild institutions that have been based on the planned administration of economic activity.  Any
economy undergoing such a mammoth transformation is likely to suffer adjustment costs, and the
Czech Republic has experienced several years of negative growth while it redesigned its institutions
and retrenched for a new environment.  In 1994, the Czech economy apparently “turned a corner”
and attained positive economic growth for the first time.  It has repeated this achievement in each
succeeding year.  Some authors predict that transition nations may sustain real GDP growth rates
two to three times that of European Union nations, but disagreement within the government on how
to proceed in the future predicts problems in the Czech case.  Annual growth rates of 5% may thus
not persist in the near future.
The banking system in decentralized market economies is important for economic activity,
and especially in those nations without well-developed financial markets.  In centrally planned
economies, banks’ sole function was to supply enterprises with funds to fulfill a central production
plan.  State-owned banks supplied funds to state-owned enterprises simply as a factor of
production, without much concern for repayment.  In market economies, profit-maximizing
behavior by individuals in an environment of uncertainty requires banks to overcome substantial
information problems in channeling resources from ultimate savers to ultimate borrowers.  And by
screening loan applicants and monitoring successful applicants’ performance to maximize
repayment likelihood, funds will reach those worthy firms requiring loans to finance their
investments and working capital.
The Czech banking system is interesting since it has been set up with the help of
international organizations, yet is undergoing many changes as it develops.  It is widely viewed to
be among the best banking system of the former socialist economies.  Legislation and regulation has
gone to great lengths to provide banks with a clear incentive structure: owner/managers are
responsible for profits and losses and may sink or swim.  The Czech National Bank, a modern
central bank, regulates banks to protect the system while maintaining these incentives.  It has
allowed some banks to fail while setting up mergers for others.2
This paper focuses on reasons why private banks have not contributed more positively to
the Czech transition process.  The year 1995 was the second year of positive economic growth in
this new market system.  Indeed, the Czech Republic attained a strong 4.8% growth of real GDP. 
Despite this healthy growth, we observe that Czech banks shifted their portfolios massively from
loans to liquid assets.  This is puzzling indeed since it is difficult to ignore one’s priors that
transition nations require a tremendous amount of new investment to modernize the obsolete
equipment inherited from the earlier political system.  Is it possible that firms have satisfied this
pent up demand for loans already in 1995?  This shift in portfolio was substantial: it reduced loans
on Czech bank balance sheets by around 6% of their assets, corresponding to nearly 3% of GDP
(CNB).  The reasons for the shift gives insight into why banks have not played as prominent a role
as expected.
A growing literature seeks to explain the early 1990's U.S. “credit crunch”, a particularly
severe slow-down in lending, see reviews by Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Sharpe (1995). 
Despite similarities, e.g. new enforcement of the Basel requirements of capital relative to risk-
weighted assets, evidence in the Czech case suggests other mechanisms are at work.  The Czech
Republic at this time enjoyed an improved reputation with foreign investors.  Capital in-flows
resulted.  In a determined effort to achieve an M2 target, the central bank sterilized, i.e. removed
much of the effect of these inflows on monetary aggregates.  Yet this policy in a fixed exchange rate
regime in the absence of capital controls led to higher interest rates, attracting more capital flows
and thus requiring yet more sterilization.  These policies increased the cost of making loans with
domestic deposits and gave an definite advantage to lenders using foreign funds.  This advantage
was compounded in 1995 when the Czech National Bank imposed a limit on banks’ access to short-
term foreign liabilities.  Larger Czech and foreign banks were able to circumvent this capital control
and thus lend at lower cost for increased profits and market share.  Small banks, on the other hand,
faced razor thin lending margins, a condition that could help but contribute to the banking problems
that surfaced in 1996.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section II, I briefly review the
Czech Republic’s recent achievements and sketch in some detail its banking system.  In section III,
I examine possible “natural” reasons for the Czech bank lending slow-down during the years 19933
through 1995 using data on a majority of individual Czech banks.  In section IV, I turn the focus
more fruitfully to monetary policy based explanations.  Finally, I conclude in section V with some
policy suggestions.  
II.  The Czech Republic: Recent Performance
The Czech Republic has achieved economic progress in 1995 and 1996 that may be
favorably compared to developed western economies.  It has indeed accomplished many tasks in its
goal of becoming an efficient market economy.  For example, it has redirected its trade toward the
west, reassigned ownership of most of its goods producing firms, reduced substantially the
economic activity done under the aegis of the state, maintained low unemployment while reducing
inflation, and rapidly built up the foreign exchange reserves needed to maintain its exchange rate
target and so withstand volatile capital flows.
At the time of the study, the Czech Republic was at the very turning point, moving from
the fourth straight year of negative growth in 1993 to positive and increasingly strong real GDP
growth in 1994 (2.8%) and 1995 (4.8%).  Activity may have been near to capacity:  the
unemployment rate hovered around 3.5% each year in the study.  This improved performance has
been recognized by the cash-rich developed world.  Rating agencies such as Moody’s have
continued to upgrade their estimates of both the country’s and the leading banks’ repayment
likelihoods.  As a result, the Czech government and the best banks can now obtain foreign loans at
very low premia over the risk-free international lending rate.
One gift inherited from the communists is that the Czech government is not compelled to
pay high interest expenses.  The very low level of national debt, corresponding to 12% of GDP in
1995, would easily permit the Czech Republic meet the Maastricht criteria for entry into the
European Monetary Union (cf. the 70% European Union average).  The Czech government has not
squandered this gift.  It has run budget surpluses consistently since 1993 and moreover has not
drawn on the credit line made available by the IMF (Camdessus, 1994).
II.A.  Development of The Czech Banking System1 The insurance is funded from bank contributions.  Commercial banks must pay 0.5% of each
insured deposit.  Savings banks pay only 0.1%.
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Any institution undergoing transformation is likely to reflect traces of its own earlier state. 
The forerunner of the Czech banking system was a simple instrument of the central planner to
channel resources to the state-owned firms in order to fulfill the five-year plan.  Remnants of the old
system are still visible long after the 1989 velvet revolution, 1991 bank reforms, and January, 1993
bifurcation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics.  The current banking market is
dominated by two banks which comprise about 50% of total banking system assets (Aspekt
database, 1995).  The largest bank, Komercni Banka, is a commercial bank and was created in the
split-up of the former socialist monobank (the other sibling is the Czech National Bank).  The
second largest bank, Cesky Sporitelna (representing the remains of the former state savings bank),
concentrates on savings and lending to individuals and small firms.  The 1991 reforms furthered the
banking system‘s institutional development towards traditional European banking, which permits
universal banking (i.e. banks may make equity investments in firms and engage in investment
banking).
The Czech National Bank (CNB hereafter) has been designed to be a modern western
central bank.  It was created with the help of international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund.  It has considerable independence from the government, e.g. CNB governors have
6 year terms.  Its primary objective is to defend price stability (and it has achieved surprisingly low
inflation rates, e.g. 10% in 1994 and 9.1% in 1995).  It is also regulates the banking system and in
pursuit of this responsibility it is empowered to impose strong sanctions, including to levy fines,
take over bank management, and withdraw banking licenses. For greater depositor confidence, it
established in 1994 a scheme to insure 80% of depositors’ funds below Czech Koruny (Kc
hereafter) 100,000 (approximately 4,000 USD)
1.  Furthermore, it has begun to enforce that each
Czech bank attain the same level of capital per risk-weighted assets as EU banks according to the Basel
agreement.
In common with many post-socialist states, the Czech banking system has unfortunately
inherited a stock of loans made to former state enterprises which have only little likelihood of
repayment.  The Czech government has dealt with this in a very sensible way.  It set up a single2 The Czech government has been under increasing pressure due to its hand’s off attitude with
respect to these conditions.
3 Those Czechs saving for construction projects at licensed savings banks are given a state
subsidy of 25% of their savings (up to Kc 18,000 maximum per annum), see CNB Banking Supervision
publication.
4 The CNB, in agreement with the Czech Finance Ministry, has not licensed any new banks
since 1994 in a drive to consolidate the banking system.
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consolidation bank, Konsolidacni Banka, as the repository of many questionable loans existing at the
time of the changeover.  As a result, banks face clear profit incentives: they cannot plausibly point to
problems inherited from the socialist system as basis for help from the government or central bank. 
Moreover, the financial system is less prone to bank failures and their consequences.  Since
Konsolidacni Banka’s performance does not reflect profit-oriented behavior by either its clients or
managers (it has a unique license to manage these loans and is not permitted to extend new credits, see
Vojtisek, 1993), I drop it from subsequent analysis.
II.B. Current Czech Banking System
The Czech financial system has not yet developed to incorporate the range of financial
instruments found in western Europe.  For example, the use of derivatives is limited and mutual funds
have not won a large presence.  The Prague stock exchange has been criticized by the international
business press as prone to manipulation by insiders
2 and perhaps for this reason has not attracted as
much foreign capital as it might otherwise have.  As a result, enterprises look mainly to bank loans as
an alternative to cheaper internal funds (i.e. retained earnings) for investment.  
The current system remains dominated by the two former socialist banks.  Not only do they
share approximately one-half of total bank system assets in 1995, but thanks in part to their extensive
branch networks, they have disproportionate access to nominally cheaper domestic deposit funds (60%
in 1995, Aspekt data).  Thanks to the few alternatives to banks as saving instruments and to the state
savings subsidy
3, the average deposit rate hovered within 20 basis points of 7% during this study, nearly
an administered rate.  This rate is at least 2% below the level of inflation, but may yet be less attractive
than foreign funds, as I argue in part IV, below.
In addition to the two dominant banks, the system in 1995 consisted of 53 mostly smaller and
new banks
4.  Among these are 10 foreign “branches” which include the German giants Commerzbank5 The compensation for interest rate risk, possible lost profits due to fluctuating interest rates
by paying on liquid liabilities while earning on illiquid assets, is likely less important in the Czech case
since 74% of new credits granted in 1995 were of short-term maturity. (CNB)
6 The lending reduction does not imply that banks are less important in the Czech financial
system since both deposits and total assets increased in real terms (see Boyd and Gertler, 1993).
7 The figure 1 line with circular symbols is aggregated from Aspekt data, which excludes
foreign bank branches.  The line with triangular symbols adds the foreign exchange loans from CNB to
the aggregate from Aspekt, thus making the conservative assumption that Czech banks made no foreign
exchange loans.
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and Deutschebank.  They operate exactly like Czech banks with the exception that their parents are
responsible for all their commitments (CNB).  The CNB states that it treats foreign-owned Czech banks
exactly as domestically-owned banks. 
One  “problem” the Czech National Bank faces is that the stock of national debt does not
permit sufficiently thick markets in government debt.  The CNB therefore lacks sufficient government
paper to drain liquidity from the banking system and carry out its monetary policy intentions.  It has
thus issued its own debt to carry out monetary policy actions.  Due to the low quantity of discount loans
requested by private banks, the CNB has often manipulated minimum reserve requirements to absorb
liquidity, an instrument often shunned by central banks as being too blunt. 
II.C.  1995: Czech Banks’ Thirst for Liquidity?
Many theories predict that bank loans are positively correlated with economic activity.  This
includes especially those by credit channel theorists, some of whom assign a causal role for bank loans
in economic activity (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, Calvo and Coricelli, 1993 and Kashyap and
Stein, 1997).  Banks earn their highest return from loans as compensation for the chance of loss in
making an accurate evaluation of loan applicants’ ability and willingness to repay their debts
5.  It is then
surprising that in 1995, a year of highly positive real growth, banks switched away from loans by more
than 3% of GDP
6 into liquid assets such as cash and short-term bills, instruments which yield lower
returns than loans.  In their portfolios, the Czech banks’ share of loans dropped from 53.2% of assets to
46.4% (where it remained in 1996), while securities rose from 12.3% to 17.4% in 1995 (CNB).  Figure
1 shows that total loans including those denominated in foreign exchange increased slightly in real terms
in 1995
7.  The right graph shows though, the steep change in the banks’ portfolios away from lending. 
Despite common features to the 1990's U.S. lending slowdown, e.g. the banks’ shift from8 Banks hold loss reserves amounting to 45% of the risk-weighted amount of classified loans
on their books, thus cutting the potential loss to the banking system (CNB).
9 The CNB does not publish per-bank data on classified loans.
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loans was almost fully reflected by a rise in liquid assets at the same time that the central bank began to
enforce the Basle capital requirements, this 1995 Czech episode does not seem to be a credit crunch. 
According to Bernanke and Lown (1991), a credit crunch is “... a significant leftward shift in the supply
curve for bank loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential
borrowers”.  Neither of these two conditions held.  Interbank interest rates, representing Czech banks’
lowest source cost of funds, rose in the latter half of 1994, and importantly relative to foreign interest
rates.  Further, foreign investors’ perception of the Czech borrower improved as indicated by repeated
ratings upgrades by e.g. Moody’s.  These points will be developed further in section IV. below.
III. Are Loan Supply or Demand Factors to Blame?
In this section, I focus on arguments for the cause of this puzzling slowdown in lending by
Czech banks at a time we might expect lending to increase, given the health of the economy and the need
to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure.  One candidate cause I will consider only briefly is based on
changes in the stock of bad loans.  These “classified” loans, amounting to 38.6% of total credits
8 as of
1994 (CNB), no doubt played a role in banks’ problems.  But the growth of classified loans declined
slightly in 1995 (CNB estimate), so in the absence of other information
9, I seek other explanations for
the lending slowdown.
III.A Demand Factors
It is useful to split the Aspekt data by bank size to see if some segment of the bank sample
was disproportionately involved in this switch from loans to liquid assets.  Table 1A shows that small
banks, those with assets of less than Kc 100 billion (which includes all but 4 banks), were more severely
affected: their drop in loans per total assets were double that of the larger banks’.  Indeed, small banks
reduced total lending even on a nominal basis.  Dividing the bank sample on a foreign-local dimension
shows that small banks owned by Czechs were affected disproportionately.  As seen in table 1C, foreign
banks (and these are purely small banks) increased their lending slightly, although their loans to total8
assets did decrease substantially.  
Why then this decline in lending by small banks?  Has there been a reduction in loan requests
by small firms, those likely to be the main customers of small banks (assuming that large banks have the
resources to lend to both small and large firms)?  Or have the best small firms switched their loan
requests for some reason to larger Czech banks?  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to conclusively reject these hypotheses, but several pieces
of evidence point to a limited role for demand side effects in the banking sector turmoil of 1994 and
1995 (and 1996). First, Cesky Sporitelna maintained the same loans to total asset ratio between 1994
and 1995.  This bank specializes in loans to individuals and small firms. Further, while aggregate Kc
loans increased in nominal terms 6.3% (to 825.7 Kc bn), those denominated in foreign currency
increased 128.2% (to 104.3 Kc bn) (CNB).  Unfortunately, many of these loans are made by banks
outside the data set, most likely by the foreign bank branches (see Table 2).  Further, Anderson and
Kegels (1997) using  Czech Statistical Office firm-level data show that early privatized and de novo
(i.e. relatively small) firms faced severe finance constraints, which “appeared to increase in severity
from 1993 to 1994" (they had no data for 1995 at the time of writing).  Finally, even if some firms did
voluntarily switch to larger banks, it is likely that this occurred as a result of price considerations, i.e.
large banks offered the less risky small firms a lower interest rate.  I will show in part IV, though, that a
cost advantage was the likely basis by which the larger banks were able to make these loans. 
III.B.  Loan Supply Causes
Some authors have included among the goals of a transition economy’s banking system that of
being the instrument used by the government to “harden the budget constraint” (Caprio, 1996).  
Accordingly, what we are observing is that Czech bank managers have awakened to the real substantial
losses in making delinquent loans.  Czech banks have thus apparently dedicated themselves to
henceforth give loans only to “deserving” firms.  The lower loans observed thus represents phantom
loans, those granted according to earlier (and easier) Czech lending criteria.  However, this logic does
not compellingly explain the large decline in loans.  First, bad loans did not decrease substantially
(CNB) which might be expected if short term loans to bad firms were strongly restricted.  Foreign-
owned banks should have been imposing a hard budget constraint all along.  As seen in Table 1C,
though, their loans increased slightly over the previous year.  And there is nothing to suggest that a10 Aspekt data; the CNB also reports that in 1995 bank capital adequacy exceeds by 0.6% the
8% required by the Basel Commission.
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sudden banking sector “enlightenment” occurred in 1995.
A second, perhaps more plausible bank supply argument is one in which banks switch to cash
and short term bonds because they fear a liquidity crisis.  Such banking behavior was common and well
documented in the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  While it may be reasonable to
ascribe it to a transition economy, little evidence exists to support this claim.  For example, although
banks strongly increase their liquid assets (Figure 1), it is also true that their deposits increase.  The
Czech deposit insurance, however, covers individuals’ deposits only up to a paltry 100,000 Kc
(approximately $4,000).  In a time when financial crisis threatens, individuals would reasonably
withdraw deposits, but we observe public’s currency to deposit ratio unchanged (see Table 3).  Further,
the liquid assets of the largest two banks also increased.  These banks are “too big to fail” in that a
serious problem in either bank would very likely spill over to the other banks and instigate system
collapse.  The CNB, like most central banks, would seek to contain such a crisis at its roots and
therefore support both Komercni and Sporitelna banks prior to the outbreak of widespread problems. 
There is thus little to support an insurance motive for the build-up in liquid assets.
III.C. Adjustment to Basel Capital Requirements
The Czech Republic ratified the Europe Agreement on February 1, 1995.  The goal was to
allow a ten year transition period to adjust the nation’s legal, institutional and economic systems to
encourage an early entry into the EU (see Anderson and Berglof, 1996).  Accordingly, in 1995 the CNB
began to monitor the banks’ risk-weighted capital to ensure compliance with the Basel rules.
The credit crunch literature has focused on the “capital crunch”, that phenomenon that
bank inspectors were too severe in implementing the Basel requirements, as culprit of the lending
problems in the U.S. (see Sharpe, 1995).  Has the Czech central bank’s pressure on the banks to
increase capital been responsible for the decline in real lending?  There is little support in this case. 
Small banks having a low level of own contributed funds per total assets (below 8.5% in 1994) actually
increased their loan market share (Table 1B).  Further, in the aggregate, the level of capital to assets
remained approximately the same between 1994 to 1995
10, so any pressure on banks to add to their
capital could not have had a substantial influence on the banking system as a whole.11 The CNB maintains the crown to a currency basket of DM and USD (65% and 35%
respectively) since 1992, when it switched from a wider-based basket.  
12 This is the “portfolio balance” explanation, see page 1937 (Lewis, 1995)
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IV. A Monetary Policy Explanation
IV. A. Twin Goals: A Fixed Exchange Rate and an M2 Target
According to policy statements, the CNB focuses on the real exchange rate (along with the
real wage) as a key variable in the economy.  To stabilize this rate, the CNB has maintained a nominally
fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar and deutsche mark throughout the period of this study
11.  Fixing
exchange rates to that of a low inflation nation is often believed to help reduce a central bank’s
discretionary monetary policy power to thus “import” low inflation.  The ultimate policy goal is to avoid
a real appreciation and thus ensure its firms’ competitiveness with the nation’s main trading partners.  A
major disadvantage of fixed exchange rates is that they are subject to speculative attacks which may
eradicate the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves.
The simple textbook view of monetary policy ineffectiveness under mobile capital and fixed
exchange rates is held by most economists (see for example Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997).  Yet the
CNB’s pronounced  policy intention in 1995 was inconsistent with this accepted wisdom.  “The target
was to maintain an annual inflation rate of between 10% and 12%. The CNB monetary program was
directed at reducing inflation in a period of economic growth.” (CNB).  What happened was that the
CNB interpreted higher than targeted M2 growth in 1994 would bring an excessive rate of inflation.  Its
subsequent attempt to limit money growth in a fixed exchange rate regime in fact succeeded in
restricting M2, but ultimately brought high costs to the banking sector.  
A model that allows monetary policy to be effective under fixed exchange rates and mobile
capital requires a risk premium that is sensitive to the amount of assets the central bank injects into the
economy in place of money
12 (Lewis, 1995).  So in the case of a capital inflow, the central bank will
sterilize, i.e. replace foreign assets with its own bonds, thus inducing a larger risk premium.  This
compensate foreign investors for the higher risk of holding Czech-denominated assets so that they will
remain indifferent between the foreign and domestic assets.  Yet academic research has not found much,
if any, empirical support for the effectiveness of sterilization (see again Lewis, 1995).  In the Czech
case, the sterilization simply raised the interest rate differential to augment the attractiveness of Czech13 The first investment grade rating by the CNB’s bonds was attained in 1993.  Further up-
grades occurred in the second and third quarters of 1994.  
14 The CNB discount rate increases in October, 1994 and June, 1995 probably had a minimal
impact on monetary policy since discount loan changes amounted to less than 2% of the 1995 monetary
base change.
15 Foreign direct investment, representing less-easily reversed funds, are relatively insensitive
to interest rate changes.  Portfolio flows, e.g. to the Prague Stock Exchange, were slow due to low
turnover.
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denominated assets and maintain a high level of capital inflows.
The CNB implemented its combined fixed exchange rate and M2 target strategy in an
international environment of an easier monetary policy in nearby Germany and increasing confidence of
international investors in the Czech economy, as indicated by ratings improvements by Moody’s, S&P,
etc
13.  The initial impact of these influences was that the Czech Republic became a more attractive
investment location.  In response to some inflows, the CNB began a series of policy moves intended to
slow the growth in M2 and protect its inflation goal.  The CNB undertook this tightening in several
steps commencing with an increase in minimum reserve requirements in June of 1994
14.  The CNB’s
final 1995 tightening move came in August when it again raised the minimum reserve requirements. 
Ultimately, the policy resulted in a rise in Czech interbank rates that was greater than the rise in US
interest rates.
As might be expected, the policy-induced higher interest rates made the Czech denominated
assets more attractive, so the inflows accelerated as reflected in the balance of payments (Table 4).  The
“other capital” category is especially influenced by monetary policy.  It includes both long- and short-
term capital flows that often terminate in Czech banks
15.  As shown in the table, the inflows of 31bn Kc
in 1993 slowed to only 4.2 bn Kc during the first three quarters of 1994.  Following the monetary policy
moves, however, they strengthened substantially in the fourth quarter and cumulated in a net inflow of
23 billion Kc.  The inflows accelerated during 1995, finally amounting to 115 billion Kc.  This
corresponds to over 9% of that year’s GDP!  Figure 2 (lower left) shows the excess of the Kc rate over
the DM rate and expected depreciation.  It is differenced, thus showing the change in the German
investor’s incentive to invest in Czech deposits.  The second line of the figure shows the “other” capital
flows into the Czech system.
The CNB then imposed capital controls in August of 1995, aiming to force Czech banks to16  In one instance in 1995, Komercni bank led a consortium of Czech banks that were given a
5 year loan at a premium of only 20 basis points over the LIBOR interbank rate. 
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limit their short-term foreign liability exposure to 130% of their foreign assets.  While this restricted
foreigners from depositing demand deposits in small Czech banks, it did little to prevent the best Czech
banks from acquiring long-term foreign loans
16.  I discuss the ramification of this move later.  The
capital flows finally subsided in February, 1996 at about the time the CNB instituted a ten-fold
widening of the bands around the central parity (to 7.5%).  This gave the CNB freedom to manipulate
monetary policy without committing to enter the foreign exchange market, and thus represented the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate.
IV. B. Defending the Monetary Base: Sterilization
According to standard descriptions of different definitions of money, a central bank can
perfectly control only the monetary base, the currency provided to the economy and those deposits of
ready funds it holds for commercial banks.  Yet in an open economy context, any foreign inflow
converted into domestic currency will increase the monetary base.  To regain control of the monetary
base, the central bank must sterilize, i.e. reduce its assets or increase its liabilities to offset the higher
monetary base (see Mishkin, 1995).  
The CNB admits to a significant degree of sterilization; almost Kc 130 billion or nearly 11%
of GDP in 1995.  This estimate encompasses many influences, since it sums any reduction of central
bank assets or rise in non-monetary liabilities.  For conservative calculations based rather on intended
sterilization, Table 5 shows the CNB nearly doubled sterilization pressure from 37% of the inflows in
1994 to 68% in 1995.
The CNB implemented sterilization mainly by issuing its own securities (the limited amount of
Czech government debt prevented the CNB from buying bonds from the public).  It also engaged in very
extraordinary transfers of deposits from commercial banks to its own liabilities.  These transactions
amounted to over 42 billion Kc and involved the foreign exchange arising from the sale of the
telecommunications company and deposits of the privatization fund.  Finally, the CNB increased reserve
requirements which have a compound effect on monetary aggregates.  Higher reserve requirements have
a direct on sterilization due to the fact that it must trade fewer securities to maintain the same pressure
on lending.  As a result of a 1 Kc inflow deposit, the CNB need sell (1 - rr) securities to banks to hold17  I focus on M2 since the CNB is most concerned about that monetary aggregate.
18 The only significant change to this M2 category was due to the CNB-arranged transfer of
the SPT purchase deposit from the commercial banks to the CNB and its subsequent deposit abroad.
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constant excess reserves.  A rise in reserve requirements, though, also cuts the money multiplier,
representing banks’ (and the nonbank public’s) power to expand the monetary base.  Higher reserve
requirements reduces the bank system’s deposit-creating ability since banks must hold a greater share of
funds at the central bank rather than lend them out.  Table 3 shows that rising Czech reserve
requirements contributed to a substantial reduction in the M2 multiplier.
In the following paragraphs, I specify the public’s and commercial banks’ influence on the M2
multiplier
17 in order to clarify the discussion.  The public selects a share of their money to be held in
either demand deposits or currency, thus determining the currency deposit ratio.  The banks select the
share of reserves they hold above the amount required by the central bank.  This determines the excess
reserve ratio. Equation (1) gives the definition of the monetary base: the required reserves (in the case
where reserves requirements differ on demand and time deposits) plus excess reserves and currency (see
Mishkin, 1995 for the case of a common reserve requirement).
( ) 1 MB r D r T ER C DD TD = + + +
Rearranging in a form useful to describe the M2 multiplier: 


















M2 consists of currency in circulation and demand deposits (M1) plus time deposits and residents’
foreign exchange deposit holdings.  This gives the following equation, where t is the ratio of time to time
plus demand deposits, c is the ratio of currency to time and demand deposits.  I assume f, the ratio of
foreign exchange deposits to time plus demand deposits to be zero in the remainder of this analysis
18.
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In the Czech experience of 1993 to 1995, it is instructive to trace the private sector’s response to the
CNB’s policy moves (see Table 3).  Commercial banks acted rationally to the original 9% rise in
demand deposit reserve requirements: they induced their depositors to switch to time deposits, as
indicated by a ratio of time deposits increasing to 59% of total, non-foreign exchange deposits by the19 The increase in reserves may have been too large for the banks to “digest” (their loans rose
gradually through the year, while (sterilized) deposits jumped much higher in the fourth quarter).
20 I use the 1995 excess reserve ratio of 7% for conservatism.  The build up in excess reserves
may be in anticipation of further increases in reserve requirements, but it also may be due to (large)
banks exploiting a window of opportunity in obtaining low cost long term foreign deposits.
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end of 1995.  This switch, though, added to the banks’ cost of using time deposits when the CNB raised
the requirement on time deposits by 5.5%.  Further, the increase in the excess reserves to total deposits
ratio observed in 1995
19 is consistent with banks anticipating further rises in reserve requirements
(which occurred in August, 1996).
As a result of the combined behavior of the public and commercial banks, the banking
system’s power to expand any change in the monetary base was reduced by over 25%
20 (see Table 3). 
Judging from the tone of the annual reports, the CNB viewed this restriction of banking power in money
creation as a large success.
IV. C. The Effect on Banks
Reading the CNB Annual Reports, one is struck by the prominence that the CNB gives to
achieving the M2 target.  In 1995, for example, the CNB stated its sterilization operations succeeded to
“...offsetting almost the entire issue of liquidity [from the foreign inflows]”.  Yet there was no concern
for possible negative ramifications on the banking sector, though the CNB obviously aimed to slow the
growth of bank-created money (recall its 27 billion Kc transfer of telecommunications deposits from the
commercial banks).  A clear indication of the impact on the banking sector is the extremely thin profit
margins on loans using interbank deposits, the least-cost domestic source of funds (see again Table 6
and Figure 2). 
Bankers in Prague complain that foreign banks have an unfair cost advantage that allows them
to make loans on attractive terms to the best Czech firms.  Accordingly, Czech banks are relegated to
lending to the remaining, less attractive Czech firms.  One should not immediately discount this
argument as based on protectionist motives.  Czech banks do enjoy a “home-court advantage” in the
form of an extended branch network.  It gives them a captive deposit base on which they pay a below-
inflation deposit rate.  To account for the true costs of using these deposits for loans, however, on must
include the opportunity cost of the reserve requirements (the CNB does not pay interest on reserves). 21 The relatively low Czech interbank rate is explained by Cesky Sporitelna’s role as main
supplier of these funds and the savings subsidy scheme cited in footnote 3.
22 The Economist estimates that between 1991 and 1997 bank crises in the Czech Republic
imposed a cost of over 10% of GDP.
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As Table 6 shows, the CNB’s tightening of reserve requirements effectively rendered unprofitable loans
using Czech deposits
21.  Moreover, banks with access to German deposits were given an additional cost
advantage since the CNB’s higher requirements occurred precisely when the Bundesbank was lowering
theirs (Bundesbank, 1995).  Most inflows into the Czech Republic in 1995 came from Germany (of the
$3.8 billion increase in foreign bank claims on Czech banks, 43.4% came from German banks, while
only 12.7% came from the U.S. and 13.1% from Austria (BIS)).
The CNB policy’s final impact on small Czech banks came in the form of a capital control in
August, 1995.  All banks were restricted from accepting foreign short-term deposits.  But since small
banks are less likely to have the size necessary for an international presence, they were unable to
overcome information problems to accept longer-term foreign debt.  This lack of international access
further limited their competitiveness and resulted in an extremely low return on their own capital.  Table
7 shows that those Czech banks with access to foreign credit were clearly able to achieve greater returns
on their own capital than either foreign-owned banks or (a 100 fold difference to) domestic banks
relegated to using Czech deposits for funding.  The squeeze on smaller banks further allowed those with
access to foreign funds to increase their market share of loans by two percent, from 67% to 69%. The
CNB policy, then, brought further problems to smaller banks and plausibly contributed to a 1996
shake-out in which 8 of these banks failed.  Some observers estimate a very high cost of these failures
on the Czech economy
22, with consequences that may be felt beyond the near future.  
IV. D.  Policy Evaluation
The Czech economy did very well in 1995, attaining high real growth, low unemployment and
relatively low inflation.  This is an especially great achievement when it is remembered where this
nation was only 6 years earlier.  Some of the credit goes to the Czech National Bank for its monetary
policies.  Real growth, however, slowed somewhat in 1996 and with the eight bank failures in 1996 may
indicate that policy makers could learn from the experience of 1995.  In this section, I examine the16
CNB’s performance in achieving its targets.  
The CNB’s goal was obviously to avoid an appreciation of the real exchange rate in order to
maintain the competitiveness of Czech producers and simultaneously to avoid overheating the real
sector and thus achieve low inflation.  This strategy did not succeed in bringing inflation convergence to
either the dollar or DM levels.  And so despite the CNB’s great efforts, the Kc appreciated substantially
in real terms against both currencies.
The CNB held to its M2 target in a very determined way, but in so doing, it raised interest
rates above the level consistent with devaluation expectations and the inflation differential, making
Czech denominated instruments more attractive for international investors.  At the end of 1995, the M2
target was nearly in its acceptable range while the nominal exchange rate was successfully defended. 
The victory was costly, however: an appreciated real exchange rate and troubles in the banking sector.
Policy makers might have expected inflation to be stubborn, so they better would have allowed a less
precisely fixed exchange rate policy vs. the U.S. and Germany.  After all, inflation differentials lead to
nominal depreciations in the long run, according to Mussa’s (1979) stylized facts.
Was it an unstated CNB goal to cull out weak Czech banks?  After all, the CNB was so
concerned about an previous increase in banks that it declined to issue any new banking licenses
between 1993 and 1995.  If it was a policy, though, other means could have been used that avoided
hurting the entire small Czech bank sector.  Another question: was it a specific CNB goal to build up
foreign exchange reserves?  After all, other former socialist economies such as Hungary and Poland
built up similar “war chests”.  Accordingly, the CNB may have sought to reassure foreign investors that
the Czech Republic was solvent and an attractive area to invest less easily reversed funds.  These
questions are left for future research.
V.  Summary and Conclusions
The Czech Republic, a success among those nations emerging from the planned economic
systems of central Europe, has witnessed banks shifting massively away from loans during a time of
high economic growth.  I find the Czech National Bank’s attempt to restrict M2 growth in an
environment of fixed exchange rates and free capital movements the proximate cause.  This policy
brought higher market interest rates that accelerated capital inflows in the third quarter of 1994.  The17
Czech National Bank viewed these inflows as requiring sterilization to drain liquidity from the economy. 
Czech banks’ build up of short-term paper was one result, and smaller banks’ lower competitiveness vs.
foreign banks was another.
While the 1994-1995 monetary policy seems to have been misdirected, it is also reasonable to
ask whether the Czech Republic could have allowed greater bank lending without facing higher
inflation?   With 3½% unemployment, well below the natural rate of most economies, the CNB may be
congratulated for maintaining to its strong anti-inflation policies.  And after all, just six years earlier
this nation did not worry about inflation or bank competition.  The CNB’s strategy kept inflation
admirably low and built up foreign exchange reserves.
On the other hand, how much sterilization was really necessary?  If the CNB did not defend
the nominal exchange rate so fiercely, they would not have had to sterilize to the extent they did.  The
interest rate differential with Germany did not reflect a risk premium, but rather an opportunity for
higher interest on Czech denominated assets.  In the third quarter of 1995, the restriction on banks from
accepting short-term foreign liabilities allowed larger banks to utilize cheaper, longer-term foreign
loans.  The policy lengthened the effective maturity of the inflows, better for banking system stability.
But they helped institutionalize a two-tier banking sector, especially indicated in the return on
contributed funds (see Table 7).  It seems obvious that the lower lending profit margins contributed to
the eight bank failures in 1996.  These bank failures incurred costs of lost confidence, restricted
competition, and lower future growth that are difficult to calculate but are likely significant.  Worse yet,
loans may not have been made available to firms which could have undergone restructuring.  The
painful loss may have been more easily endured during the period studied, a period of strong Czech
growth, rather than in a later period, perhaps a first “normal” recession.18
Table 1 
Lending by Banks: Different Break-downs
Table 1A.  Large vs. Small Banks
1993 1994 1995
Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh
Small 94.9 55.2% 17.0% 129.1 56.8% 19.7% 108.3 46.1% 16.1%
Large 462.0 54.3% 83.0% 527.9 53.1% 80.3% 566.0 48.2% 83.9%
Banks are classified as large if their assets are above 100 bn Kc 
Table 1B. Banks with Low “Own Funds”
1993 1994 1995
Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh
Low 101.3 54% 18% 117.6 51% 18% 130.5 42% 19%
High 147.6 66% 27% 195.1 65% 30% 178.4 55% 27%
C.S. 112.0 35% 20% 119.1 33% 18% 119.8 33% 18%
K.B. 196.1 67% 35% 225.1 68% 34% 245.6 60% 36%
Banks are classified as low if own funds vs. total assets are below 0.085 in 1994.  “Own funds” are the owner’s
share of funds in the enterprise and thus include total capital plus reserves for bad loans.  Those banks with low
own funds per total assets in 1994 which remained in the data base in 1995 maintained their market share in the
later year.  Loans are in billions of Czech Koruny.  C.S. is Cesky Sporitelna and K.B. is Komercni Banka.
Table 1C.  Foreign vs. Domestic Banks
1993 1994 1995
Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh Loans L/TA Mkt Sh
Foreign 61.7 52.7% 11.1% 82.5 56.6% 12.6% 86.6 48.4% 12.8%
Domestic 495.2 54.7% 88.9% 527.9 53.4% 87.4% 587.7 47.8% 87.2%19
Table 2
The Missing Banks
3Aspekt Bks 1993 Others
Cash 57.7 294.6 IB Liab Cash 22.9 21.3 IB Liab
IB As 273.8 647.6 Dep IB As 3.7 51.6 Dep
Loans 631.6 58.9 Oth.Liab Loans 38.0 8.3 Oth.Lia
Bills 41.4 109.6 Own K Bills 12.8 38.2 Own K
Tot.Ast 1125.7 Tot.As 122.0
3Aspekt Bks 1994 Others
Cash 58.0 297.7 IB Liab Cash 33.4 61.1 IB Liab
IB As 279.9 768.8 Dep IB As 21.5 61.2 Dep
Loans 733.3 87.0 Oth.Liab Loans 62.9 25.0 Oth.Lia
Bills 63.2 168.2 Own K Bills 11.4 28.4 Own K
Tot.Ast 1331.8 Tot.As 166.0
3Aspekt Bks 1995 Others
Cash 112.4 383.5 IB Liab Cash 78.1 81.2 IB Liab
IB As 293.7 853.2 Dep IB As 23.3 98.9 Dep
Loans 747.4 117.5 Oth.Liab Loans 128.0 141.0 Oth.Lia
Bills 110.0 160.9 Own K Bills 45.9 49.3 Own K
Tot.Ast 1532.1 Tot.As 353.0
The missing bank balance sheets were obtained by subtracting the sum of the Aspekt data (the left
column of balance sheets) from the totals given by the CNB in their publication Banking
Supervision in the Czech Republic.
Approx. 4% of the total assets in the Aspekt data set in 1995 were discarded due to unreliability. 
Table 3
Behavior of M2 Multiplier
1993 1994 1995
c .10 .12 .12
e .03 .05 .13*
t .50 .53 .59
rDD .09 .12 .085
rTD .03 .03 .085
µ 5.58 4.46 3.33
See equation 3; c = currency /(TD + DD), e = excess reserves
/(TD + DD), t = TD/(TD + DD), f = foreign exchange
deposits /(TD + DD), assumed 0 (in practice, f fluctuated
little over time except for SPT deposit in 3
rd qtr, 1995)
The multiplier was calculated using values of variables at the
end of each year.
* For the first 3 qtrs of 1995, e = .07 for a multiplier = 4.1.20
Table 4
Brief Balance of Payments (Kc bn)
Year & Qtr 93/1 93/2 93/3 93/4 94/1 94/2 94/3 94/4 95/1 95/2 95/3 95/4
Current Account 12.4 10.5 4.0 -14.3 10.2 7.4 -2.8 -6.5 -4.0 -3.5 1.2 -18.4
Non-res Capital 10.6 27.1 8.3 30.9 14.4 10.0 15.0 30.9 36.9 24.7 71.2 62.5
Fgn. Dir. Inv. 8.5 2.1 1.4 3.1 2.3 6.5 4.7 10.7 2.9 7.3 42.0 14.8
Portfolio 0 10.9 9.8 10.2 6.0 9.8 6.1 1.8 2.3 14.6 8.2 17.8
Other Capital 2.1 14.1 -2.8 17.7 6.2 -6.2 4.2 18.4 31.7 2.8 21.0 29.9
Errors & Omis. -10.8 -7.7 15.4 1.8 -3.9 .2 -5.7 -1.0 67 5.4 1.1 14.0
FX Reserves -12.2 -29.9 -27.7 -18.5 -20.7 -17.7 -6.5 -23.3 -39.7 -26.6 -73.5 -58.1
*Source: Czech National Bank; Positive entries in capital accounts indicate capital inflows; Negative entries
in FX Reserves indicate increase in Czech National Bank’s foreign exchange reserves.  Large FDI entries
include large deals such as 37 bn Kc purchase of Czech Telecom in 1995 
Table 5
CNB’s Degree of Sterilization
1994 1995 1995 (QI-III)
)FX holdings, offset by: 68.2 197.9 139.8
Increase in CNB bills 20.4 74.9 11.6
Special accounts* - 42.3 42.3
Reserve Requirements** 4.9 16.8 11.9
Share of FX sterilized 37.1% 67.7% 47.1%
)MB 38.6 123.2 50.0
















In billions of Kc.
* The CNB transferred deposits from the National Privatization Fund and the SPT
Telecom away from the commercial banks.  In the case of the SPT, a 27 bn Kc foreign
exchange deposit was placed abroad yet also included in M2.
** Based on the idea that to sterilize an inflow into a bank deposit of 1 Kc, (1-rr) must be
cut from the MB for the bank to have unchanged lending opportunities. I used shares of
deposits as of the end of the year.
† Excludes the SPT’s Kc 27 bn foreign exchange deposit held abroad21
Table 7
Lending by Bank Ownership and Access to Foreign Funds
1993 1994 1995
ER/TA Loans L/Mkt R/OF ER/TA Loans L/Mkt R/OF ER/TA Loans L/Mkt R/OF
Local -0.4% 115 21% 4.6% 0.1% 150.2 22% 1.0% 2.8% 141.4 21% 0.1%
F-owned 0.5% 57.4 10% -21.3% 0.4% 69 11% 1.2% 2.2% 68.5 10% 1.4%
F-access 0.4% 384.4 69% -13.7% 0.2% 437.9 67% 5.4% 2.1% 464.4 69% 10.8%
Loans are in Kc billions.  The market share columns represent only those banks in the data set.  Banks were
determined to have access to foreign funds in 1995 if their interbank deposits increased more than 10 bn Kc over
their interbank assets between the years 1994 and 1995.  Banks in this group include Komercni Banka, Cesky
Sporitelna, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni, Citibank, and Creditanstalt.
Table 6
1 Kc Loan Cost using Different Funds Sources
1994 1995
Quarter I, II III, IV I, II III, IV
Avg. Rate on New Credits 12.9% 13.1% 13.3% 13.3%
DD 12.7% 16.6% 16.4% 12.1%
TD 14.3% 13.8% 13.7% 20.4%
Domestic Interbank 8.4% 9.9% 10.6% 11.2%
Expected Depreciation* 3.1% 3.4% -0.4% -1.2%
German Interbank (3 mo) 6.0% 5.0% 4.8% 4.3%
DM deposit** 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1%
 Entries reflect that to make a 1 Kc loan, a bank must collect deposits of 1/(1-rr) to
have sufficient funds remaining in order to satisfy the reserve requirement.
* based on perfect foresight 6mo. avg.. DM exchange rate in future. Add this row to
foreign rates for cost of using German deposits since a Czech bank borrowing at the
German interbank rate must repay a foreign deposit in more expensive DM.
** based on the Bundesbank reserve requirement of 2% on time deposits and a 2%
time deposit rate.22
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